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In this paper I display a general metaphysical assumption that 
characterizes basic naturalistic views and that is inherited, in a 
residual form, by their leading teleological rivals. The assumption is 
that intentional states require identifiable inner vehicles and that to 
explain intentional properties we must develop accounts that bind 
specific contents to specific vehicles. I show that this assumption is 
deeply rooted in representationalist and reductionist theories of 
content and I argue that it is deeply inappropriate.  
I sketch the main features of plausible alternatives: such alternatives 
are either anti-representationalist (Dynamical Systems' models) or 
anti-reductionist (institution-based approaches), and are not 
committed to any such metaphysical premise.  
 
 





 There are two important approaches in contemporary 
Philosophy of Language. One of them, let's call it the formal 
approach, is mainly concerned with those semantic properties of a 
given language that help us to understand the reference of its 
individual expressions and the truth-conditions of its sentences. 
This is semantics in its purest form. The other, let's call it the 
psychological approach, is likewise concerned with the semantic 
properties of the expressions of a language, but those semantic 
properties are now filtered through the psychological/biological 
features of the user of the language. Philosophers taking the 
psychological approach are interested in providing e.g. an account 
of the truth-conditions of the sentences of a language only insofar 
as such semantic analysis might help in the explanation of the 
linguistic and non linguistic behavior of the speaker. Semantic 
properties are thus the means, not the ends. The target is not so 
much to explain 'the relationships that hold between expressions of 
language and things in the world' as to explain why the expressions 
of a language have precisely the meaning they have and no other, 
and how the fact they have that meaning affects the behavior of the 
cognizer or language user. Alongside this psychological interest is 
often found an essentially scientific aspiration, namely, to reconcile 
semantic facts and a naturalistic world-view. Hence the proliferation 
of (among others) causal, informational and teleological accounts of 
content. 
 In this paper, I shall focus on the psychological, scientifically 
oriented, approach and, in particular, on teleological theories. A 
teleological theory of content is mainly concerned with the problem 
of content-fixing from a naturalistic point of view. The exact 
meaning of 'naturalism' in this context is itself an open question. 
The standard idea, however, is that semantic properties are not part 
of the primitive ontological furniture of the world and that, if we are 
to vindicate those properties as real, we must show how to unpack 
them into some other —more primitive and thus scientifically 
acceptable— set of properties. Naturalistic theories of content are 
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thus typically reductionist theories. The title of Ruth Millikan's 
influential monograph Language, Thought, and Other Biological 
Categories (1984) neatly encapsulates the spirit of such proposals. 
Language and thought are depicted as further parts of the natural 
order and meaning is reduced to a biological commodity. 
 I shall address the question of the nature of meaning against 
that teleological backdrop. My main contention is that the 
motivating spirit of teleological (and other naturalistic) approaches 
to meaning is deeply inappropriate precisely insofar as it seeks to 
characterize meaning in biological or evolutionary terms. In 
developing this thesis, I shall make explicit some metaphysical 
assumptions underlying teleological and, in general, naturalistic 
approaches to content. I will examine, in particular, the role played 
by the philosophical notion of constitution in the analysis of content 
and its consequences for a standard explanatory strategy in 
psychology. I will also develop some alternative metaphysical and 
explanatory notions which lead to a more positive thesis about the 
nature of meaning. 
 
 
2. Evolution and Constitution. 
 
The semantic naturalist typically insists that an illuminating account 
of semantic properties be developed using the same type of 
explanatory framework found in the natural sciences, namely, a 
framework of causal relations and functional roles. Such a 
framework is supposed to account for the two most puzzling 
features of meaning: that meaning is normative, namely, that to 
know the meaning of an expression is to know how to use it 
correctly (even if that knowledge is not explicit), and that 
meaningful states, such as beliefs, can be false. Assuming that 
certain inner or outer tokens corresponding to a belief are produced 
if and only if a certain property is instantiated (e.g. there being bugs 
around), such belief tokens (or B-tokens for short) would be false if 
they are produced when that property is not instantiated. They 
would be used incorrectly in the same case. Add an evolutionary 
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spin to this causal approach and teleological accounts emerge. A 
given belief of type B has a particular content, e.g., 'there is a bug 
out there', if and only if some mechanism has been selected because 
(causally historically because) it has produced tokens of a certain 
type in the past whenever there were bugs around. This specific 
kind of  naturalism with regard to intentionality thus involves a 
view of contentful mental states as states with biological purposes. 
Biological purposes are, in turn, characterized in evolutionary or 
selectionist terms. 
 I will take Millikan's approach as the paradigmatic teleological 
approach to semantics (But see also e.g. Papineau 1990 and Neander 
1991). A detailed rehearsal of her work is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but what matters for our purposes may be summarized as 
follows: Mental representations are understood as 'teleofunctional 
items', i.e., as items which are produced by biological mechanisms 
that have been selected during evolutionary history and that are 
designed to perform some 'proper function'. Some item A has a 
function F as its proper function only if either:  
 
(1) A originated as a "reproduction" ... of some prior item or 
items that, due in part to possession of the properties 
reproduced, have actually performed F in the past, and A 
exists because (causally historically because) of this or these 
performances. (2) A originated as the product of some prior 
device that, given its circumstances, had performance of F as a 
proper function and that, under those circumstances, 
normally causes F to be performed by means of producing an 
item like A. 
(Millikan 1989a, p. 288) 
 
 The key to understanding representation is, however, to focus 
not on the representation's production, but on its consumption. The 
idea is that for something to be a representation at all, it must be a 
representation for the system itself. 'It is the devices that use 
representations that determine these to be representations and, at 
the same time ... determine their content' (Millikan 1989b, p. 282). 
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Only if certain conditions are met, can we say that a systemic 
mechanism will perform its proper function in consuming e.g. a 
belief token. Those conditions are (i) that a certain property P be 
instantiated when the system's mechanism consumes B-tokens and 
(ii) that the instantiation of that property actually explains why the 
production of B-tokens enables the system to perform its proper 
function. The content of a belief, like any other biological entity, 
thus turns not on the causes of the belief so much as on the 
advantageous results produced by the belief. Tokens of a certain 
belief type have as their content that e. g. there is a bug in front of 
the frog if it is required (for evolutionary purposes) that there be a 
bug in front of the frog in order for its bug detector neural 
mechanism to perform its proper function. In other words, we have 
to assume a 
 
certain rule of correspondence having the following property: 
unless we assume that some actual condition in the world 
corresponds in accordance with this rule to the representation 
confronted by the consumer, we cannot account, with any 
single explanation that covers historical instances of consumer 
successes generally, for why the consumer produces the effect 
that is its function. 
 
(Millikan 1990a, p. 154) 
 
 If, for the sake of the argument, you agree that e.g. frogs have 
beliefs, then frogs (who have a neural mechanism in virtue of which 
they snap their tongues when they detect a bug) have beliefs of the 
type 'there is a bug in front of me'. The content of the frog's belief is 
about bugs and not about e.g. visually identical black dots because 
the proper function of states of that type is related to the presence 
of bugs, not of black dots, i.e., because the neural mechanisms have 
been selected due to their producing tokens of that type whenever 
there were bugs around. 
 Millikan's position has been criticized in a variety of ways, of 
which I shall mention just two. In a very interesting paper 
 5 
addressing a more general question concerning the consistency of 
the use of concepts with naturalistic views, Christopher Peacocke 
claims that teleological approaches are inadequate since they cannot 
offer a constitutive account 'of what it is to enjoy content-involving 
states' (Peacocke 1990, p. 63). Reformulating his contention using 
the frog example, Peacocke's diagnosis can be summarized as 
follows: teleological accounts are fine if what you want to explain is 
why the frog has a neural mechanism that produces tokens of the 
type 'there is a bug in front of me', but it doesn't help much with 
the real question, namely, what it is for the frog's neural mechanism 
to count as supporting a belief with that specific content.  
 Paul Pietroski has also criticized Millikan's teleological 
approach and has defended a thesis related to Peacocke's. The thesis 
is that the relation 'proper function' is a relation that beliefs can 
bear to properties sometimes instantiated in the system's 
environment. But 'proper function' is not, as Millikan claims, the 
relation 'has as its content that' (Pietroski 199, p. 268). The main 
reason for this mismatch is that, where intentional explanations are 
concerned, the emphasis should be on discriminatory abilities 
rather than on historical importance. 
 Pietroski diagnoses Millikan's failing as due to a conflation 
between ethological explanations (that show how a certain behavior 
plays a useful role in the life of a system or the members of a 
species) and intentional explanations (that show how a certain 
behavior is the product of how the system takes the world to be). 
Since both kinds of explanation sometimes make reference to the 
same properties, Millikan's teleological account of content appears 
plausible. But this overlap is just a fact that stands in need of 
explanation itself. What Millikan has done —according to Pietroski— 
is thus to sketch 'a new and potentially interesting kind of 
explanation of a certain range of behavior. But this is not intentional 
explanation; and the relation captured by Millikan's apparatus is not 
the relation that intentional states bear to their contents' (Pietroski 
1992, p. 280). 
 Although Pietroski doesn't formulate his criticisms of 
Millikan's account in terms that involve the notion of constitution 
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(as Peacocke does), the conflation he mentions between Millikan's 
notion of proper function and the notion of content, and the 
conflation between ethological and intentional explanations could 
also be framed in such terms. What he is trying to show is that 
although Millikan's notion of proper function does capture 
properties that contribute to the individuation of the content of our 
beliefs, such properties don't constitutively characterize specific 
contents. That, at least, is how I interpret his main reason for 
claiming that explanations based on the notion of proper function 
don't always capture what it really is for the agent to have a belief 
with such-and-such a content. 
 Interestingly though, neither Peacocke nor Pietroski question 
the centrality of the notion of constitution itself. It is just taken for 
granted that constitution is the relation intentional states bear to 
their contents and that non-constitutive accounts of content ought 
to be dismissed as inadequate. I don't intend to discuss whether 
Peacocke's and Pietroski's analyses of Millikan's position are correct, 
but rather to examine their diagnoses of the problem. I find the 
diagnoses interesting in themselves because they raise two issues 
that deserve special attention. The first is whether the kind of 
relation intentional states bear to their contents must necessarily be 
a constitutive one. The second issue is what makes an intentional 
explanation a good explanation of some specific item of behavior. 
 
 
3. Metaphysical Commitments. 
 
It is important to notice, first of all, that the whole teleological story 
only works on the assumption that mental states are content 
carriers: physical structures that encode information and that are 
causally correlated with instantiated properties. It is also important 
to realize that this same assumption lies at the core, not only of 
teleological approaches to content, but of a whole group of theories 
that can be gathered together under the rubric of 
representationalism. 
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 Representationalism is, roughly, the positing of internal 
mental representations as the bearers of semantic properties, and it 
has been, at least until very recently (see below), something of an 
accepted dogma among philosophers of mind and cognitive 
scientists. Major differences concerned only the nature of the 
posited mental representations, with classicists and connectionists 
arguing in favor of language-like and distributed representations 
respectively. But this did not really affect the positing of internal 
representations themselves (even though the characterization of the 
appropriate notion of representation is not an easy philosophical 
task). 
 To remind you of just one aspect of that discussion, recall the 
occasional arguments supposed to establish the 
(non)representational nature of patterns of activation in 
connectionist systems. Distributed connectionist models are made 
up of networks of neuron-like units, and these units don’t have a 
direct semantic interpretation. Since such networks' computations 
are completely determined by activity at the unit level, and the 
units each help to encode information of many different types, it is 
not possible to identify a stable and recurrent entity that 
corresponds to the classical notion of a symbol. There are thus no 
straightforwardly isolable vehicles at the physical level that can be 
identified as the articulated supervenience base on which the 
semantic properties of our mental states supervene. On this basis it 
has been argued that connectionist models of cognition cannot be 
used in support of the causal efficacy of content (Cf. Ramsey, Stich 
and Garon 1991). 
 The general reaction, however, was that this problem was 
more apparent than real. For a proper treatment of the 
connectionist paradigm —as a cognitive model— has to be 
developed at a level of description higher than that of mere 
numerical units and activations (see e.g. Smolensky 1988). It is not 
strange that, by restricting ourselves to the units and weights level, 
we get unsatisfactory accounts of semantically interpreted behavior. 
However, within the connectionist paradigm, there exist techniques 
of analysis that let us ascend to a higher level of description; a level 
 8 
of description at which we can identify items that play the same role 
as the representations and rules of classical systems, although they 
have a character rather different to that of classic symbols and 
algorithms (Cf. Clark 1990). 
 Regardless of its own intrinsic interest, what I want to stress 
about this debate is, on the one (classicist) hand, the positing of 
semantic vehicles without further discussion and, on the other 
(connectionist) hand, the uncritical acceptance of the need to find 
the 'right level' of description: one where connectionist analogues to 
classic semantic vehicles might be identified. Both positions thus 
maintain a deep commitment to the idea of content carriers whose 
physical properties can enter in causal explanations of behavior. 
 This Aristotelian image of the content and the container 
imports with it an implicit thesis about the kind of relation that 
exists between intentional states and their contents. The thesis, 
roughly put, is that such a relation is to be cashed out in terms of a 
notion of constitution. The idea is that what it is for a particular 
thing to be a thing of a certain kind is completely determined by the 
stuff of which it is made, by its intrinsic properties. Intrinsic 
properties make something what it is and are thus constitutive of 
that particular thing. Applying this general metaphysical idea to the 
intentional realm results into the following deep framing 
assumption: what makes an intentional state have the content it has 
are the properties constitutive of the physical state upon which such 
intentional properties supervene. This notion of constitution stands 
out as the metaphysical glue that binds intentional states to their 
contents. 
 To focus the overwhelming influence of this seldom discussed 
metaphysical assumption (an exception is Rudder Baker 1995), 
consider a different and important debate in contemporary 
philosophy of language and philosophy of mind: the debate between 
internalism and externalism. Internalism is the view that holds both 
that the content of a mental state supervenes on intrinsic physical 
states of the subject, and that such contents are individuated 
'narrowly', i.e., without essential reference to the subject's physical 
and social environment (see e.g. Fodor 1975, 1980). The externalist 
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position, by contrast, denies that mental contents supervene on 
intrinsic physical properties of the subject. The externalist claims 
that contents are individuated 'widely', i.e., by reference to the 
subject's environmental or social context (see e.g. Burge 1979, 
1986). The point I want to stress is that the main challenge for the 
externalist is to show that relational properties can actually play a 
constitutive role in the characterization of the contents that 
putatively explain the agent's behavior. The internalist can agree 
that the individuation of computational states of cognitive systems 
is relative to the properties of the world that they inhabit. But, from 
such an internalist point of view, this is just to say that the world 
determines the agent's cognitive states (via the inputs), and not that 
the external features can play any constitutive role in the 
characterization of such states. The externalist has to show how her 
claims about content can be constitutive claims, and fans of 
externalism usually try to do so without ever questioning the 
plausibility of the basic requirement. 
 Why should this notion of constitution be lauded as the only 
acceptable metaphysical relation for the characterization of content? 
The root of the answer lies in a widely accepted conception of the 
mental: a conception that involves the combination of 
representationalism and a computational view of the mind. Once we 
commit ourselves to this computational representationalism, we 
commit ourselves to the idea of inner vehicles of mental content. 
Semantic properties are contained in some physical vehicle that acts 
as the guarantee of their causal efficacy, and thus allows the 
philosopher to reconcile the semantic realm and the natural world. 
But, if we opt for such a (reductionist) strategy, then what drives the 
characterization of content is the internal complexity of the state, 
i.e., its intrinsic, constitutive properties. Additional pressure comes 
from the idea that  computational explanations fix the form of good 
psychological explanations. Since computations, at least as 
standardly conceived, cannot be sensitive to properties external to 
the system, we seem forced once again to the conclusion that the 
only properties that count in binding the intentional realm and the 
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natural world are the intrinsic properties of constituting physical 
states. 
 It is therefore an interesting philosophical exercise to look at a 
non-representationalist, non-computationalist approach to cognition 
to see how things work there. If we find that non-representationalist, 
non-computationalist accounts can actually provide good 
intentional explanations, then we will be able to conclude, at least, 
that that familiar notion of constitution doesn't necessarily have to 
be the only acceptable metaphysical relation that might bind 
intentional states to their contents, and therefore that broadly non-
constitutive accounts should not be rejected solely due to their non-
constitutive status1. The Dynamical Systems approach to cognition, 
is one of the few exceptions in contemporary Cognitive Science to 
both the dogmas of representationalism and of computationalism. 
Although a detailed discussion of the Dynamical Systems' viewpoint 
is beyond the scope of this paper, I shall sketch some of its main 
features in the next section. In Section 5, and with a more 
philosophical eye, I will sketch some pragmatic accounts of content 
which place the ontological notion of institution (as opposed to 
constitution) at the core of their analysis. 
 
 
4. The Dynamics of Cognition. 
 
Cognitive Science is largely agreed on at least this: that at the heart 
of a scientific understanding of cognition lies the construct of 
internal representation. Both defenders of explicit, syntactically 
structured, classic representations (e.g. Newell & Simon 1972; Fodor 
& Pylyshyn 1988) and of connectionist, distributed representations 
(e.g. Smolensky 1988) retained the fundamental idea of inner 
computational states acting as the vehicles of specific contents. 
Cognitive Science is also agreed on the idea that computational 
explanations are good intentional explanations and that a 
computational theory of cognition (one which builds in the notion 
of representation. The two theses are thus internally related) is the 
correct way to go about the explanation of cognitive behavior. 
 11 
 In recent years, however, a much more radical view has gained 
some ground. This view calls into question the commitment to 
internal representation itself and the suitability of computational 
theories of cognition as explanations of the behavior of cognitive 
agents (see e.g. Beer 1995). Cognition, it is claimed, need not involve 
the creation and manipulation of anything deserving the name of 
'internal representations' at all. The image of 'cognition as 
computation' is said to be no longer the 'only game in town' (van 
Gelder 1995, p. 346). Under this new perspective, cognition is 
characterized as 'state-space evolution in certain kinds of non-
computational dynamical system' (van Gelder 1995, p. 345). 
 Without going into too much detail (see Clark and Toribio 
1994 for an extended discussion), the general idea is this: internal 
representations are an unnecessary and unproductive posit for the 
analysis of real-time, environmentally-embedded behavior. The 
dynamicist thus stresses the difference between systems which are 
intrinsically computational and systems which merely admit of 
computational modeling (e.g. planetary motion). The difference is 
between systems which really do have internal representations and 
system which do not (Cf. Beer 1995). Cognitive systems, it is 
claimed, are better characterized in terms of continuous circular 
exchanges between the physical / biological features of an organism 
and those of the environment in which the organism is embedded 
and functioning. Where content-involving descriptions are suitable 
for the explanation of such a cognizer's behavior, they involve a 
notion of content that is characterized by the abilities of the systems 
to interact in specific ways with the world in which they are 
situated. 
 The relevant systemic properties are thus not constitutive 
properties in the classical, standard sense, i.e., they are not intrinsic, 
context independent properties of the system whose behavior we 
trying to explain. Instead, the properties that count for the 
characterization of content are, mainly, external, context- and 
environment-dependent properties of the system. This is because 
the kind of behavior that mainly interests the anti-
representationalist is characterized by constant circular causal 
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exchanges between the system and the environment in which the 
system is embedded. 
 As a result, the notion of internal content carriers has 
vanished from the (pure) Dynamical Systems approach. Instead 
what we find is a general formalism based on the idea of an abstract 
geometric state space whose dimensionality is of arbitrary size 
(depending on the number of relevant system parameters). The 
system's behavior is explained in terms of location and motion 
within that space. Some geometrical constructs are invoked, 
constructs that capture properties of certain points or regions in the 
space. The mathematics typically specifies a dynamical law which 
determines how the values of a set of state variables evolve through 
time. Given an initial state, the temporal sequence of states 
determined by the dynamical law constitutes one trajectory through 
the space. The set of all the trajectories passing through each point 
is called the flow, and the shape of this 'flow' is the typical object of 
study (see e.g. Abraham and Show 1992 for more details).  
 Nothing in this picture preserves the idea of a particular 
computational state as the vehicle of the content that explains a 
given behavior of the system. And without the idea of a 'vehicle', we 
lose also the idea of the intrinsic properties that constitute it. Yet 
the Dynamical Systems literature is full of cases in which we obtain 
nonetheless a good explanation of a target system's behavior. This is 
especially clear in developmental applications. Here, Dynamics is 
emerging as the most suitable explanatory framework in which to 
address e.g. processes of self-organization and adaptation 
underlying the development of mature cognition. Increasingly 
psychologists are seeking to understand the changes involved in 
cognitive development in dynamical instead of representationalist 
terms. This non-computational approach has been most extensively 
pursued, it is true, in cases where the parameters to which the 
system is responding are straightforwardly physical and are 
available to the systems as proximal stimuli. This is the case, for 
example, in explanations of reaching and grasping in infants (see 
e.g. Thelen 1995). But the model has also begun to be applied to 
highly complex tasks such as natural language processing. Jeffrey 
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Elman, for instance, has developed a model of natural language 
processing in which the ability to predict the next word in a 
sentence after having being presented with the first n words in a 
sequence is analyzed using dynamical tools. Here, the idea of 
locations in a state space replaces the idea of internal 
representations of words, the structure of that space replaces the 
idea of a dictionary or word meanings and the dynamics of the 
system replaces the idea of grammatical rules (see Elman 1995). 
 Of course, it could be argued that even a given flow in an 
abstract geometrical space is constituted by such-and-such points or 
trajectories, and that such constitutive properties of the flow are the 
relevant ones in the explanation of the system's behavior. Such a 
response, however, misses the main point of the alternative 
approach, because the set of trajectories passing through each point 
wouldn't be as it is without the continuous reciprocal interactions 
that obtain between the system itself and various external features. 
Such constant reciprocal causal interaction is built into the 
dynamical description of the state space. Features external to the 
biological organism thus figure in the account of cognition itself. In 
this vein, van Gelder and Port comment that: 
 
Cognitive processes span the brain, the body, and the 
environment; to understand cognition is to understand the 
interplay of all three. Inner reasoning processes are no more 
essentially cognitive than the skillful execution of coordinated 
movement or the nature of the environment in which 
cognition takes place. The interaction between "inner" 
processes and "outer" world is not peripheral to cognition, it is 
the very stuff of which cognition is made.  
(Port & van Gelder 1995, p. ix) 
 
 The answer to the 'real' question about content, namely, what 
it is for the system to have a belief with such-and-such content is 
thus answered, within this dynamical view, in terms that invoke the 
system's abilities to act in the larger environment in which is 
situated2. Those abilities are not what they are merely in virtue of 
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some underlying intrinsic physical structure. Instead, what matters 
are rather the 'superstructural' facts concerning the space of 
environmental interactions into which the system enters. The 
metaphysical relation that applies here is thus not that of simple 
constitution. The relevant relation is one of institution (more on 
which below). 
 An important caveat. My depiction of the Dynamical Systems 
approach as anti-representationalist should be understood against 
the background of a view of representationalism as roughly 
equivalent to the belief in inner computational vehicles for specific 
contents. I do not thereby preclude some alternative thesis about 
the nature of representation itself. Obviously, how we define 
representation will greatly affect our views about the full force of 
the 'anti-representationalist' claims (see Clark & Toribio 1994). But 
given a familiar and restricted interpretation of representationalism, 
the idea is clear: we are to reject inner computational states as the 
key explanatory factor in understanding intentional behavior, and 
with it the metaphysical assumptions concerning constitution. 
Constitution by intrinsic physical or functional states should not be 




5. Cognition Institutionalized. 
 
Let me now make some related points at a more philosophical level. 
Some recent theories about content do take, as their core 
explanatory notion, the practical interactions of the subject with her 
environment, especially those kind of interactions that involve some 
discriminative ability on the part of the subject. Such discriminative 
abilities, it has been suggested, are critical to the project of 
individuating the contents of our thoughts. The claim is not new. It 
can be found in some of the writings of the later Wittgenstein and is 
central to Dummett's and Evans' characterizations of the nature of a 
theory of meaning (See Dummett 1975, 1976; Evans 1982). More 
recently, Adrian Cussins' (1992, ms.) and Robert Brandom's (1994) 
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analyses of linguistic content stand out as existence proofs of the 
potential richness of this alternative explanatory strategy. Both 
these projects defy easy rehearsal, but I'll attempt a brief sketch of 
what is most important for our purposes. 
 Brandom's project is to develop a pragmatic account of the 
content of the expressions of a language in terms of a notion of 
commitment. Commitments are characterized by a kind of deontic 
status and deontic statuses are instituted (not constituted) by social 
practices. The ontological notion of institution is thus at the core of 
Brandom's pragmatic account of content:  
 
Our activity institutes norms, imposes normative significances 
on a natural world that is intrinsically without significance for 
the guidance or assessment of action  ...   ...  The explanatory 
strategy adopted here is to begin with practices that institute 
deontic statuses of commitment and entitlement and then to 
show how those practices thereby confer specifically 
propositional conceptual contents on what is assertible. 
(Brandom 1994, pp. 48, 169) 
 
 Cussins' project is to develop what he calls a 'naturalized 
transcendentalism', But what is most interesting for our purposes is 
the fact that institution —even if not as explicitly as in Brandom's 
case— again lies at the core of the posited relations between 
intentional properties and physical properties. Material, social and 
historical contingencies institute the complex network of normative 
activity systems that make human cognizers what they are: 
 
Cognizers participate in the maintenance and construction of 
normative activity systems which are larger, more 
complicated, more capable, and perhaps more meaningful 
than they themselves are. These systems —loci of meaning and 
value— include institutions, historically established cultures, 
social customs and norms, built environments, friendships, 
technologies, languages, arts and artefacts and facts. 




 In Section 2, we saw how teleological views —and naturalistic 
views, in general— try to account for the two most interesting facts 
about meaning: its normativity and the fact that meaningful states 
can be false. We saw that such accounts include a reductionist thesis 
(in the case of teleology, the reduction is toward biologically 
characterized functions), and a causal explanatory strategy based on 
constitutive physical properties. The key move in both Brandom's 
and Cussins' proposals is rather to make normativity the central, 
irreducible feature of meaning. The goal of accounting for semantic 
properties in a naturalistic way thus becomes the goal of preserving 
that essential feature. As a result, the standard naturalistic strategy 
is altered in many respects. First, no reductionist assumptions 
underlie this way of characterizing semantic properties. The 
normativity of linguistic content is the starting point and is treated 
as ineliminable. Second, although the normative dimension of 
language is claimed to be ineliminable, it can still be explained and 
an explanation of it is offered, so it is not treated as some kind of 
bare primitive. Third, this explanation is not framed in causal or 
constitutive terms. The normativity of language is understood as 
instituted by social-practical activity: 
 
Though this normative dimension of linguistic practice is 
taken to be ineliminable, it is not treated as primitive or 
inexplicable. It is rendered less mysterious in two ways. First, 
linguistic norms are understood as instituted by social-
practical activity  ... The second way norms are rendered less 
mysterious is by explaining exactly what is expressed by 
normative vocabulary ... This is an explication of explicitly 
normative conceptual contents in terms of implicitly 
normative practices, rather than a reduction of normative 
terms to nonnormative ones. 
(Brandom 1994, pp. xiii-xiv) 
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 Once again, the 'real' question about content, the question 
about what it is that confers a particular content on an intentional 
state, is answered in terms of the superstructures into which the 
biological system enters. An additional advantage of the more 
philosophical treatment is that, unlike the Dynamical Systems 
accounts, it is especially designed to encompass more abstract 
properties of the environment (the aspects of the social setting can 
be as rarified and distal as one desires), and it is especially geared 
towards an account of linguistic meaning. In fact, social institutions 
are the super-structures par excellence for the characterization of 
linguistic meaning. To know how to use a linguistic expression 
correctly requires membership in a social institution and the 
normativity of meaning (the basic feature that more naturalistic 
approaches were unsuccessfully trying to capture) is intrinsically 
and essentially attached to such institutions. 
 A word of warning. I do not claim to have shown that accounts 
built on the idea of institution offer better theories of content 
(although I try to defend that thesis elsewhere. See Toribio 
submitted). What the alternative institutional view brings to light 
here is just the possibility of characterizing the notion of content in 
a deeply non-reductionist manner. It is thus an existence proof of 
the possibility of an institutionalized account of intentionality: an 
account in which meaning may be analyzed in many different ways 
but in which it is not a biological category. 
 If we now recall our earlier discussion of teleology, the 
situation looks rather interesting. For it now turns out that physical 
constitution is not necessarily the metaphysical glue that binds 
intentional states and their contents. It follows that to say (as e. g. 
Peacocke does) that teleology does not offer a constitutive account 
of content is not yet to provide a good reason to reject Millikan's 
account as inappropriate. If we still believe such an account to be 
incorrect, we must develop a different argument. This is the task of 




6. Intentional explanations, teleological 
explanations and good explanations. 
 
The general commitment to physical-constitutional explanations is 
usually tied up with the idea that good intentional explanations 
ought to be causal explanations. This link is not accidental. Indeed, 
intentional explanations are characterized in causal terms only on 
the assumption that what causes something to have a particular 
effect is nothing but its physical-constitutive properties. As we saw 
in Section 2, the internalist position in the internalism / externalism 
debate is a good example of this connection in action. The 
justification of the internalist's view flows from the physicalist bias 
of standard scientific methodology, namely, the claim that the 
causal powers of any event are completely determined by its local 
physical features 
 In teleology, however, causation is not all. There is, in 
addition, a historical, selectionist ingredient. Causation thus 
becomes historical causation and good intentional explanations are 
a species of teleological explanation. Intentional states have the 
content they do 'causally historically because' the mechanisms that 
produce the content carrying states have been selected due 
precisely to their possession of those semantic properties. The 
addition of this historical component to the causal explanatory 
framework inherited from the naturalistic / reductionist trend 
creates, I shall now suggest, an important tension within the 
teleological picture. On the one hand, attributions of beliefs to a 
system are said to be true in virtue of how the system is historically 
related to its physical environment. This permits a characterization 
of content in teleofunctional terms and seems to allow the 
teleologist to distance herself from any strong version of 
computational representationalism. After all, it is the history of an 
item that determines its proper function rather than the item's 
present properties (Cf. Millikan 1989a). It would thus seem 
misleading to construe teleology as involving the physical-
constitutive thesis, i.e., as committed to the idea that what counts 
for explaining intentional properties are just local physical features, 
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viz. the inner vehicles of content. Such a construal would go against 
the official thrust of the teleological approach, which is to insist: 
 
that psychology is not at root a science involving laws, that 
explanations in psychology are unlike explanations in the 
physical sciences, that it inescapably is a deeply ecological 
science dealing with how the organism interacts with its wider 
environment. 
 
(Millikan 1993, pp. 11-12) 
 
 Yet, residual (and I think distortive) features of the 'inner 
vehicle' model remain in place. The teleologist still takes contentful 
mental states to provide reasons that cause the agent to behave one 
way rather than another. And theorists such as Millikan are 
explicitly committed to the idea that beliefs have map-like inner 
vehicles. On her account, a system's inner mechanisms can perform 
their proper functions only because such inner maps are in place, 
even if the mapping rule (the rule that, under normal conditions, 
determines what is represented) is fixed by the evolutionary history 
of the system (Cf. Millikan 1986, p. 78).  
 We are thus left with a rather uncomfortable situation. A 
teleologist like Millikan maintains much of the apparatus springing 
from the metaphysical commitments of more standard naturalized 
approaches, including the idea that there must be real inner 
vehicles of content; vehicles that play a causal role in the 
explanation of the behavior of the system. But, at the same time, 
what determines that those inner vehicles have the particular 
contents they do is not their present properties but the evolutionary 
history of the mechanisms that produce them. 
 This residual tension would be removed if the teleologist were 
to contend that what matters for the characterization of content is 
the interaction of the whole organism with its environment rather 
than any properties —historical or otherwise— of the organism's 
internal mechanisms. But to opt for such a solution is effectively to 
give up the idea of e.g. inner maps whose causal powers explain the 
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system's behavior. In other words, such a solution would involve the 
outright rejection of the guiding scientific ideas underlying 
computational representationalism. Yet such ideas look to be 
practically ineliminable from Millikan's account, which still displays 
a clear representationalist/reductive character. To reject such ideas 
would be to turn the usual teleological approach to semantics into a 
much more radical theory. Nonetheless such a change wouldn't 
necessarily be bad news. In fact, it looks to be the easiest way to 
relieve the tension and to absolve Millikan's account from the 
criticisms noted in Section 2. 
 Even such a liberalized version of the teleological approach, 
however, faces deep (and I believe fatal) difficulties. The deep 
trouble is that such theories simply fail to provide a good 
theoretical basis for the scientific explanation of intentional 
behavior. The reason is that 'evolutionary accounts ... will be unable 
to distinguish between causal-explanatorily equivalent content 
attributions' (Godfrey-Smith 1994, p. 273). A small fable, due to 
Paul Pietroski, makes the point well: 
 
The kimus live near a large rocky hill. Their only predators are 
snorfs, carnivores who roam past the hill each morning. Kimus 
used to be "color blind". But in virtue of a genetic mutation, 
one particular kimu —call him Jack— came to have an internal 
mechanism M that produced tokens of a physically specifiable 
state type B in the presence of certain wavelengths of light. 
Each morning, something red on the hilltop caused Jack to 
form a B-token when he looked up. And Jack (like his 
descendants) turned out to have a "fondness" for red things; 
i.e., other things being equal, Jack would move towards the 
distal causes of B-tokens when such tokens were produced. So 
each morning, Jack trudged up the hill and thereby avoided 
the snorfs. Natural selection took over; and Jack's mechanism 
type proliferated throughout the species. There was no other 
reason (e.g., detection of food) for the selection in favor of 
having the "color mechanism". 
(Pietroski 1992, p. 273) 
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 Millikan claims that, for a kimu, a B-token 'signifies roughly, 
"fewer snorfs this way"' (Millikan 1990b, p. 149). According to 
Pietroski, however, '[t]here are several candidates for the content of 
a (current) kimu's B-token: Lo, redness; Lo, Wavelength W; 
Something nice is over there; There's that nice mountain top again; 
etc. Or perhaps there is no determinate content of B-tokens to speak 
of. But ... B-tokens are not about snorfs' (Pietroski 1992, p. 273). 
Given that kimus don't have any means of recognizing snorfs at all, 
and given that they can discriminate red things from non-red things 
but can't reliably discriminate snorfs from non-snorfs, it is surely 
implausible to claim, as Millikan does, that 'kimus go up the hill 
because they believe that there are no snorfs there' is a good 
intentional explanation. 
 A further reason for doubting the teleological account derives 
from the character of psychological explanations themselves. If we 
opt for a teleological characterization of content, we commit 
ourselves to the idea that the environmental properties that count 
for the explanation of an agent's behavior are always 'real' 
properties of the world. Like Millikan, we must invoke a 'rule of 
correspondence' that reflects some 'actual condition in the world' 
and a condition that affects the individual, not only as an 
individual, but as a member of one particular species. Such 
commitments, however, go against the usual explanatory strategy in 
psychology. In general, psychological explanations —explanations 
that invoke intentional states of one kind or another— do not 
appeal to evolutionary considerations in order to account for our 
behavior. The explanatorily central issues in psychology do not turn 
on debates concerning the evolutionary proper function of mental 
states. One reason is that an agent's intentional states do not have to 
be tied to the objective conditions for her survival. In fact, they 
don't have to be tied to objective conditions at all! Much of our 
mental life involves tracking properties of objects in such a way that 
the internal representations of those objects are not representations 
of the objects themselves, i.e., of the objects taken in any objective 
way at all. Instead, it is only the mode of presentation of the object 
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under a particular perspective and within a particular behavioral 
context that counts. By trying to characterize the contentful 
intentional states that appear in psychological explanations in 
teleological terms, we end up focusing on properties that might be 
very important from a biological point of view, but that don't seem 
to be that relevant in the explanatory context of psychology. 
Psychology is interested in explaining behavior (in explaining e.g. 
why an agent has responded in such-and-such way to a particular 
situation). But it is not clear that the ability to token a particular 
thought or the ability to respond appropriately to a particular 
situation must afford an agent some evolutionary advantage over 
other members of its species. And even if there were such 
evolutionary advantage, it is not obvious how to include it as a 
relevant explanatory parameter in the psychological context. 
 To sum up, I have tried to display a general metaphysical 
assumption that characterizes basic naturalistic views and that is 
inherited, in a residual form, by their leading teleological rivals. The 
assumption is that intentional states require identifiable inner 
vehicles and that to explain intentional properties we must develop 
constitutive accounts (history-based or otherwise) that bind specific 
contents to specific vehicles. This assumption, I have argued, is 
deeply rooted in representationalist and reductionist theories of 
mind and content. However, there exist plausible alternatives that 
due either to their anti-representationalism (Dynamical Systems' 
models) or their anti-reductionism (institution-based approaches) 
are not committed to any such metaphysical assumption. I have 
sketched the main features of these alternative views, stressing the 
fact that they seem nonetheless to provide good explanations of 
intentional facts. I claim that the existence of such counterexamples 
casts real doubts on the need to invoke constitution as the necessary 
metaphysical glue binding intentional states and their contents. A 
side-effect, however, is that some standard criticisms of teleological 
approaches —criticisms that accuse them of not offering a full or 
constitutive account of content— no longer apply. The real problem 
with such teleological views, I finally argue, is not to be found at the 
metaphysical so much as at the explanatory level. Teleological 
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approaches fail because evolutionary considerations simply don't 
reflect the explanatory interests that prevail in psychology. If 
meaning is a biological category, then that category doesn't belong 
to the domain where intentional explanations matter, i.e. to 
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1 An alternative is to argue for a different notion of 
computational explanation, one which still involves a 
constitutive view of the relation that intentional states bear to 
their contents, despite being characterized in externalist terms 
(see e.g. Peacocke 1994 and Wilson 1994). Such an alternative, 
however, is not so interesting for my purposes here, as it 
doesn't question the centrality of the notion of constitution 
itself.  
 
2 As we saw in Section 2, Pietroski's criticisms of Millikan were 
rooted in the relevance of present discriminatory abilities to 
good intentional explanations. Unfortunately he didn't seem to 
realize that such vindication involved not only a rejection of 
history, but also a rejection of some deeper metaphysical 
theses. 
